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ABSTRACT 
 
Current agricultural negotiations in the World Trade Organization are grappling on how 
to fully integrate agriculture within the general rules for trade in goods. The notion of 
multifunctionality of agriculture has been suggested as a reason to justify special 
treatment for that sector, including the continuation of its protection and subsidization.  
Many developing countries are still analyzing whether the idea has something to offer 
them in terms of their negotiating positions and policy framework.  
 
While multifunctionality has been invoked for supporting agriculture in developed 
countries, a similar idea, although not called so at the time, was clearly behind support for 
industry in developing countries. Again in this case, the policy implication was that 
government intervention was required (through trade protection, subsidies, and other 
special policies) to develop an industrial base that contributed to society more than what 
market valuations alone would suggest.   
 
The debate on industrialization in developing countries was part of a broader discussion 
regarding nation-building, economic development, and social modernization.  The current 
arguments around multifunctionality are similarly embedded in a larger economic, 
political and social matrix.  This paper, although it does not present a full account of 
either debate, discusses some of the intriguing parallelisms in their theoretical 
frameworks, policy implications and economic and social impacts.   The main objective 
is to clarify current policy issues for the agricultural sector in developing countries, 
highlighting possible consequences for the negotiating position of developing countries in 
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One of the central debates in world agricultural policy has been how (and, for some, 
whether) to fully incorporate agriculture within the general framework of the WTO (see 
Josling, Tangermann and Warley, 1996).  Under the previous GATT framework, 
agriculture operated under different rules. This separate treatment was in part reduced 
during the Uruguay Round, but current WTO legal texts do not yet reflect a complete 
integration of agriculture within the general trade rules for goods.   
 
There are two different views on what to do about this.  One opinion insists that 
agriculture should not be treated differently from other sectors, like industry, and 
therefore current negotiations should complete the integration of agriculture into the 
WTO framework.  One of the main issues in this regard is related to export subsidies, a 
trade practice that has been widely criticized as unfair and disruptive of international 
trade.  In contrast with industrial goods, for which export subsidies are banned in the 
WTO legal framework, these subsidies are still allowed, although with some restrictions 
(see the discussion in Section VI).  
 
Another view emphasizes the special role of agriculture, and wants to maintain a separate 
treatment.  Usually, this view is linked to the notion of the “multifunctionality” of 
agriculture, which has been recently presented, mainly by industrialized countries, as a 
new concept that must be considered in the design and implementation of agricultural 
policies (European Union, 1999; Royal Ministry of Agriculture Norway, 1998; Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 1999).   
 
The basic idea is that agriculture, in addition to its direct products, also generates separate 
positive externalities such as food security, environmental conservation, beautiful rural 
landscapes, employment, and vital rural communities.  Only counting the market value of 
agriculture, it is argued, would overlook that sector’s overall contributions to society.  A 
policy conclusion from this line of analysis is that the government could justifiably 
intervene to ensure an adequate supply of the postulated externalities linked to 
agricultural production. 
 
The idea of multifunctionality has become a contentious issue in the continuation of the 
agricultural negotiations.  Those negotiations began in March 2000, as mandated by 
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and were reaffirmed and made part of a single negotiating undertaking in Doha 
in November 2001.  The European Union, Norway, Japan and South Korea, among 
others, have argued that multifunctionality should be part of the non-trade concerns 
alluded to in Article 20 and the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture, which must 
be taken into account during current negotiations.  Other countries (basically the 
members of the Cairns Group and the United States) have opposed granting an 
independent role for multifunctionality in the conceptual framework of the negotiations 
(ABARE, 1999; USDA/ERS, 1999).  Multifunctionality has already been the subject of 
one of the longest documents presented in the WTO negotiations by a collection of 
industrialized and developing countries (WTO, 2000).  Many developing countries are  
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still analyzing whether the idea has something to offer them in terms of their negotiating 
positions and policy framework.  
 
While multifunctionality has been invoked for supporting agriculture in developed 
countries, a similar idea, although not called so at the time, was clearly behind support for 
industry in developing countries. 
1  Again in this case, the policy implication was that 
government intervention was required (through trade protection, subsidies, and other 
special policies) to develop an industrial base that contributed to society more than what 
market valuations alone would suggest.   
 
The debate on industrialization in developing countries was part of a broader discussion 
regarding nation-building, economic development, and social modernization.  The current 
argument around multifunctionality is similarly embedded in a larger economic, political 
and social matrix.  This paper, although it does not present a full account of either debate, 
will discuss some of the intriguing parallelisms in their theoretical frameworks, policy 
implications and economic and social impacts.   The main objective is to clarify current 
policy issues for the agricultural sector in developing countries, highlighting possible 
consequences for the negotiating position of developing countries in the WTO process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II briefly presents the economic 
framework under which externalities can be addressed through policy.  Section III and IV 
then review the externalities that have been invoked for industry (then) and agriculture 
(now), the policy debates, and the economic and social implications of the policies 
followed. Section V discusses briefly the differential treatment under WTO for industry 
and agriculture. Section VI concludes by analyzing some possible implications for the 
current WTO negotiations, particularly from the perspective of developing countries.   
 
II.  THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Economic policies based on multifunctionality and industrialization have both made use 
of the concept of externalities (positive or negative) arising as by-products of normal 
market activity (Marshall, 1898) and the theory of public goods (Samuelson, 1954).  The 
defining characteristic of externalities is the lack of markets to transact them, and that 
those by-products may have beneficial or costly impacts on parties other than the primary 
actors, while their generation is based solely on the private value for those primary actors.  
Society may therefore be oversupplied with a bad externality (e.g. pollution from a 
tannery), or undersupplied with a good externality (e.g. workers with practical high-tech 
skills).  Without some form of collective action, there is no guarantee of appropriate  
(from the point of view of the society) levels of supply. But collective action does not 
necessarily mean government action. Here is where the notion of public goods comes in.  
They are a class of goods or services that are, from the moment of their existence, non-
rival in consumption (my consumption doesn’t take away from yours) and non-
                                                 
1   Of course, the proponents of multifunctionality do not restrict its application to developed 
countries, although several dimensions of the concept apply mostly to more advanced countries (see 
below).  Vice-versa, the notion of government support to industrialization is not confined to developing 
countries, as illustrated for instance by the debate on industrial policies in the US especially during the mid 
eighties (see, among others, Norton, 1986, Tyson, 1992).  
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excludable (I can’t prevent you from consuming it).  Such goods do not lend themselves 
naturally to market direction, and in pure cases, not even for voluntary collective action.  
Therefore a case can be made for government regulation, or outright supply.   
 
This is precisely what has been argued both, more recently in regard to the agricultural 
sector, mostly in developed countries, and, previously, in relation to the industrial sector, 
mainly in developing countries.  In both cases, the emphasis has been on positive 
externalities of industrial or agricultural production, and the need for government 
intervention. 
 
According to proponents of support, the externalities emanating from industrial or 
agricultural production are numerous.  Table 1 shows those commonly emphasized in the 
literature on industry and development/modernization (then), and the multifunctional 
character of agriculture (now). 
 
The economic literature tackled most these issues early on, usually in the context of 
arguments related to adequate trade and development policies. Economic theory suggests 
defining the externalities clearly and identifying precisely how they are produced.  
Policymakers could then look for the intervention that most directly addresses the 
production (or suppression) of the postulated externality; or conversely, the intervention 
that least distorts other markets (Bhagwati, 1971, and Corden, 1974).  By this approach, 
the first-best solutions prescribed would almost always be different from the measures, 
such as trade protection, that have typically been utilized.  Assuming that the externality 
has been clearly identified, then the appropriate policy would be a subsidy (if it is 
positive) or a tax (if it negative), directly aimed at the externality.  The farther away from 
the externality the postulated policy operates, the larger the costs it imposes on other 
aspects of the economy. If, for instance, the externality is workers with high-tech skills, a 
direct subsidy to firms for educating their workers would be more adequate than a 
subsidy on production of high-tech goods (that generates a production distortion without 
necessarily ensuring the desired outcome), which in turn is better than trade protection to 
firms producing high-tech goods (which creates a production and consumption 
distortion). More fundamentally, if a firm or industry can internalize and appropriate the 
externality (for instance, learning-by-doing by workers that can be retained), then there 
would not be a case for any outside intervention, particularly if there are financial 
markets that can finance the acquisition of those capabilities (as in the criticism of the 
infant industry arguments by Baldwin 1969; see also Kemp, 1964).  Further, the 
intervention needed a full accounting of benefits, but also costs, in a general equilibrium 
framework.  
 
The basic conclusions were that externalities had to be truly non-appropriable, had to be 
adequately priced  (considering full costs and benefits), and had to be addressed with 
policies as closely as possible linked to the effect targeted (desired or undesired) to avoid 
indirect effects that may negate, at the level of the whole economy, the desired positive 
welfare effect.   
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Many of those debates, which have been substantially settled in the economic literature 
on trade and development, have reemerged, however, around the discussion about 
multifunctionality in agriculture. In what follows the current debate on agriculture is 
contrasted with previous discussions on industrial development, and then some possible 
implications for developing countries in the WTO negotiations are presented.    
 
 
Table 1.  Some Postulated (Positive) Externalities to Agriculture and Industry 
INDUSTRY 
Economics and Technology 
Employment 
Economies of scale 
Skilled labor creation 
Promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit 
Technological development 
Knowledge externalities  
Capital accumulation 
 







Geography and Environment 
Urbanization 
AGRICULTURE 
Economics and Technology 
Employment 
 
Politics and Society 
Food security  
Reduction of rural-urban income disparity 
Cultural heritage 
Vital rural communities 
Social cohesion 
 






III.  INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
  
Externalities and Policies 
 
After World War II, many leaders and intellectuals in the developing world saw 
industrialization as intrinsically related to nation-building.  Most would have agreed with 
Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures,” submitted to the US Congress in 1791, 
which argued: “not only the wealth but the independence and security of the country 
appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation … 
ought to endeavor to possess within itself, all the essentials of national supply”.  He 
considered it necessary  “to the perfection of the body politic; to the safety as well as to 
the welfare of the society” (Hamilton, 1791).   
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For newly independent countries during the 19
th and 20
th centuries, the policy approach 
began with the desire to break free from direct political and economic control by the 
colonial powers.  In this line of analysis dependency was embedded in the productive 
structure of the developing countries: they produced primary products and sold them to 
the colonial powers, from which poor countries, lacking a domestic industrial base, had to 
import manufactures.   It was argued that this international power architecture was also 
reflected in the social fabric of the developing countries through the presence of 
landowners and representatives of foreign capital (the latter tied directly or indirectly to 
agricultural production); and in the structure of land tenancy, where large estates and 
plantations occupied the dominant position.  From this perspective, de-emphasizing the 
role of the agricultural sector in development was part of a double process of economic 
independence and political sovereignty, on the one hand, and of a transition to a more 
equitable internal distribution of income.  
 
Even in Latin American countries, which had become independent mostly in the 19
th 
century and which after World War II had a relatively developed industrial base 
compared to other regions, the contention of unequal relations had strong resonance. 
2 
Rather than the more obvious issue of direct political control, the argument, as elaborated 
by Prebisch (1950, 1968) and Singer (1950) was an economic one: contrasting market 
structures in developed countries (characterized by industrial oligopolies and strong 
unions) with those of developing countries (characterized by smaller firms and surplus 
labor), the argument was that the former could retain the benefits of technical progress, 
while the latter surrendered gains from productivity through falling prices of their 
primary exports (hence the decline in the terms of trade).   
 
Besides nation building and economic and political independence, industrialization was 
also associated with (and, in the stronger version, would cause) social modernization.  
Rural populations were supposed to lack entrepreneurial spirit and appeared bound by 
traditional culture and organization.  So, when pioneering firms started in the urban 
centers, the creation of non-farm jobs would reduce the sway of agrarian classes.  
Urbanization was itself linked to modernization in the social sense: progressive attitudes 
and affiliations would result from it. This process was supposed to lead to an open and 
mobile society, eliminating the assignment of occupations by traditional criteria (sex, 
ethnicity, family status).  Increasing levels of general education for all citizens would 
generate a more active, pluralistic and participatory political and social life (the most 
complete presentation of these arguments is probably Kerr et al, 1964).  Although the left 
did not necessarily share this benign view of modernization, some Marxist arguments 
emphasized the need to move beyond feudalism (which was associated with the 
agricultural sector) to capitalism (identified with industrialization and the development of 
the urban proletariat) (Mitrany, 1951).  
 
Yet, for all the arguments regarding the military, political, and social externalities of 
industrialization, the bulk of the public policy discussion was conducted in economic 
                                                 
2 Latin American industry had emerged in good measure as a result of growing demand in the region and 
the natural protection offered by the breakdown of trade and finances during the Great Depression and the 
two World Wars.   
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terms.  The main objectives of industrialization were growth, employment and 
elimination of poverty (see for instance Bhagwati 1993, on the sequence of Indian Plans), 
much as the current notion of multifunctionality emphasizes employment generation in 
rural areas. 
3 But certainly, to characterize those objectives of economic policy as 
externalities of industrialization (or agriculture) would be stretching the notion too far. 
4   
The economic externalities of industrialization, which were at the center of what has been 
called “high development theory” (Krugman, 1994), involved a different set of issues: the 
interaction of economies of scale, pecuniary external economies, technological spillovers, 
backward and forward linkages, and strategic complementarities.  The combination of 
these elements suggested the existence of multiple equilibria and the need for some form 
of coordination, probably, but not only, through government intervention, to move from 
lower to higher levels of economic activity (Chenery, Robinson, Syrquin, 1986).    
  
The general case ran as follows.  In any pre-industrial economy, pioneering firms are 
subject to considerable start-up costs.  Without an industrial base (of skilled labor, 
supplier networks, experienced capital markets, etc.), each new industry is at much higher 
survival risk than they would be had they started in an already industrialized country.  
Survival risks are attributable to the structural factors noted above, and also to the fact 
that demand for industrial goods would initially be weak: without an industrial system 
producing many goods by many wage earners, the first industry is in a highly contingent 
position, whereas the hundredth is much less so (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943;  Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989).  At the same time, each new industry would contribute 
technological spillovers and the development of a skilled labor force to the society as a 
whole: learning-by-doing would contribute to the hiring firm’s bottom line (for which the 
firm is compensated), but also to the viability of the industrial sector overall (for which 
the firm is not compensated).   
 
Another issue was macroeconomic stability. Although not specified as an externality, it 
was also clear that policymakers wanted to make the economy less vulnerable to external 
shocks and avoid macroeconomic crises through industrialization.  It was assumed that, 
as the number of industrial firms increased, dependence on revenue from primary 
products would gradually be reduced, which was supposed to insulate the economy from 
external shocks and to protect against the losses implied by the postulated decline in the 
terms of trade (CEPAL, 1969). 
 
In summary, using the current term, the multifunctionality of industry appeared 
substantial: nation-building, political and economic independence, national security, 
modernization, development, technological advance, protection from external shocks, and 
so on.  But, even accepting the multifunctional effects of industry, another question still 
remained: what were the appropriate policies to attain those effects for the developing 
                                                 
3 Early development literature appears to assign zero marginal value to labor in the agricultural sector, or at 
least a value far smaller than in alternative uses (Lewis, 1954). Now multifunctionality appears to assign 
higher value to employment in agriculture than to alternative uses. 
4 There is a similar debate now regarding whether employment belongs into the notion of the 
multifunctionality of agriculture (see OECD, 2001).  
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countries.   Much of the policy thinking, which coalesced around the notion that came to 
be called Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), was based on some central themes:  
 
(i) The need to accumulate capital, increasing investment and savings rates.  For 
example Lewis (1954, 1955) argued that the central problem of underdevelopment was 
how to go from a situation where the economy is saving 4-5% of GDP to around 15-
20%).   
(ii) The importance of industrialization in the process of development.  This 
process could advance in a more or less balanced fashion (although for some, like 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) this would focus basically on light industry, while for others 
like Mahalanobis (1955) heavy industry should be incorporated), or instead could be 
propelled by the fundamental tensions of disequilibria to generate investment, as argued 
by Hirschman (1958). 
(iii) A focus on the internal market. Rather than expand exports, the approach was 
to reduce imports through domestic production. The feasibility of expanding the volume 
of exports was considered doubtful because they would come from the primary sector, in 
particular from agricultural production, which was supposed to have a low price elasticity 
of supply and because, in any case, international demand for those primary products was 
also deemed to be relatively price inelastic (Little, 1982 provides a review of this debate).  
(iv) The belief that markets and the price system would not adequately guide the 
necessary process of investment and capital accumulation, which was to be led by 
government intervention, usually a development plan with instruments such as trade 
protection and subsidies for manufactures, taxes on agriculture, and a heavy involvement 
of the State in the economy  (see the accounts by Hirschman, 1982 and Sen, 1983).  
(vi) The notion that inflationary pressures were not necessarily attributed to 
excess aggregate demand. It was thought that inflationary pressures could develop even 
without excessive levels of aggregate demand because the productive sector of the 
economy was fragmented, with key sectors operating at full capacity or showing 
rigidities to increasing the level of operation, while other sectors experienced higher 
levels of unemployment and unused capacity.  Consequently, inflationary pressures were 
supposed to fade away once the investment process made production bottlenecks 
disappear, integrating and balancing the productive structure of the economy (a 
discussion of views on inflation and development can be found in Johnson, O., 1984). 
Investment and capital accumulation, it was argued, would not only solve the internal 
imbalance leading to inflationary pressures, but was thought to also solve the external 
imbalance, which caused recurrent balance of payments crises.  The process of import 
substitution, which focused on industrial products, would move backwards from 
consumer goods to basic industries, replacing imported goods with domestically 
produced ones. In the end it was thought that the (small) remnant of non-substitutable 
imports could be financed through the (small) level of exports.   
(vii) According to the post-war development strategy, the role of agriculture was 
subordinated to the needs of the industrialization process.  Different arguments were 
utilized to support this view.  Quantitative historical analysis (for instance Kuznets, 
1966), showed that agriculture declined in importance with the advance of economic 
development. Also, and especially in Latin America, different authors argued that (a) 
agricultural production was inelastic to domestic prices, (b) that international demand  
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was also inelastic with respect to international prices, and (c) the international terms of 
trade were moving against agriculture (Cepal, 1969). If domestic production and 
international demand were inelastic, the imposition of taxes on agricultural products 
would not significantly diminish domestic production, and much of the tax would be paid 
by importing countries in the form of higher prices. Furthermore, over the medium to 
long term, deteriorating terms of trade led policy makers to pursue a diversification of the 
productive structure (industrialization) instead of favoring agriculture.  Consequently, 
from the fifties to the early sixties, the prevailing idea was to transfer resources from  
agriculture (a low productivity sector) to industry (where it was assumed that resources 
would have higher productivity).  The role of agriculture in development (see Johnston 
and Mellor, 1961) was one of transferring surpluses for higher economic growth: (a) the 
transfer of labor surpluses; workers supposedly unemployed in the agricultural would be 
transferred to industry (see especially Lewis 1954); (b) agriculture would provide food 
(wage goods) and raw materials to the industrial sector; (c) savings in the agricultural 
sector would be taxed away to sustain the process of investment in the industrial sector 
and for the development of public infrastructure; and (d) the agricultural sector had to 
generate surpluses of foreign currency to pay for the importation of capital goods and 




By the mid 1960's several concerns began to be voiced about the adequacy of this 
development strategy.  Protection and subsidies to the industrial sector to obtain the 
postulated multifunctional effects were damaging other sectors, such as agriculture.  
Schultz (1964), in an influential book, argued that the farmers in the developing countries 
were "poor but efficient", reacting with economic rationality to changes in prices and 
incentives.  If the agricultural resources were efficiently utilized, there were not gains to 
be made by the economy from transferring labor and savings to other sectors.  The 
suggestion was to support the agricultural sector through technological development and 
human capital formation in rural areas.  The participation of the State in this process was 
considered crucial (complementing the traditional vision of the role of the public sector in 
infrastructure).  The Green Revolution of the seventies and afterwards was based on the 
idea that there could be a technological solution to the rural problem.  
 
Different studies during the 1970s (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970, Balassa, 1971, 
Krueger, 1978), also criticized the strategy of development based on inward-oriented, 
import-substituting industrialization in terms of both long-run growth and efficiency 
aspects.  They pointed to the supply-side constraints generated by the structure of macro 
prices (i.e. the relative price of tradables/non tradables, of industrial/agricultural products, 
the exchange rate, the interest rate, the wage level) established through governmental 
policies. According to these studies the policies analyzed had a triply damaging effect: (a) 
they made the economy operate inside the production possibility frontier (PPF), (b) they 
slowed the outward movement of the PPF, and (c) they did not allow the economy to 
benefit from trade.   
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Criticisms mounted about the basic assumptions, the policies followed, and the 
consequences of the ISI strategy.  Some argued that the strategy of forced 
industrialization was a misapplication of historical lessons from English development: 
transfers of capital and labor from agriculture to the rest of the economy should take 
place naturally, not through policies highly discriminatory against the agricultural sector 
(World Bank, 1986).  The obvious realization that the poor in developing countries were 
concentrated mainly in rural areas led to the conclusion that if poverty alleviation were to 
be an important objective of economic policy, then greater attention should be given to 
agricultural and rural development (Chenery et al., 1974). 
 
Others pointed out that the supply of agricultural products was reasonably elastic, as was 
international demand.  The terms of trade between industrial and agricultural products—
after adjusting for quality and other factors—would not be deteriorating (for an overview 
of those debates see Balassa, 1986b). Discrimination against exports and the exclusively 
inward orientation was criticized because it failed to take advantage of the commercial 
opportunities offered by the international economy.  The costs of inefficiency and lack of 
competitive incentives to productivity growth due to protection were higher than the ones 
associated with problems in international trade.  Protected industries appeared to require 
(and strongly lobbied for) protection long after the intended period of “infancy.”  
Pervasive State intervention into capital markets made investment funds available only to 
the large, favored firms and discouraged technical advance in other sectors. On the other 
hand, developing countries following an export-oriented strategy would benefit from 
greater flexibility, efficient allocation of resources, technological development, 
economies of scale, and dynamic effects that could not be attained through reliance on 
the internal market alone (Balassa 1986b).  It was also argued that industrialization 
fostered through protectionism had generated an industrial structure more capital 
intensive than the resource endowment of developing countries required. Therefore 
poverty alleviation was impaired by policies that protected capital-intensive 
industrialization and discriminated against agriculture, generating less employment and a 
distribution of income less equal than other development strategies would have allowed.  
This process of industrialization was accompanied by an uncontrolled process of 
urbanization and the continuation and even deepening of poverty in rural areas.  
 
At the macroeconomic level, import-substitution protectionism appeared to have 
increased inflationary pressures (Krueger, 1981, 1984), and fostered unsustainable fiscal 
deficits, associated with State interventions, leading to recurrent macroeconomic crises.  
Moreover, and contrary to expectations, the countries following inward-oriented policies 
appeared more vulnerable to external shocks, and more prone to balance of payments 
crises, which, when they occurred, tended to have a stronger negative impact on the 
economy (Balassa, 1984, 1986a).  An important reason for economic instability was that 
the ISI strategy created a stop-go dynamics in economic activity: the acceleration of the 
economy usually led to fewer exports (because a larger percentage of the goods were 
consumed internally due to growing incomes) and more imported inputs and capital 
goods (demanded by the expanding industry), generating balance of payment crises when 
official external reserves reached very low levels.    
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Import substitution was even criticized in non-economic terms.   While in India and 
South Asia, industrialization took place with domestic firms, in much of Latin America it 
was related to the expansion of multinational corporations. Critics from the left decried 
the increasing power of the international capital, and attributed different economic and 
social problems to the dominance of those international corporations (Frank, 1969, 
among others).  From a very different perspective, what was called “neoclassical political 
economy” began to debate the notion of government as a benign planner interested in 
aggregate national welfare (the implicit view of much of the proposals for State-led 
development).  They pointed out the rent-seeking behavior of actors, which a state-led 
environment allowed to flourish, with virtually any intervention creating an opportunity 
for privileges, waste and fraud  (Bauer, 1972; Bhagwati, 1982; Krueger, 1974).  
Resources were misallocated because decisions were influenced by those rent-seeking 
activities, which, in addition, themselves consumed resources from the private sector that 
could have been applied to more productive ends.  
 
But it appeared that the woes of the ISI strategy did not end there: developing countries 
seemed plagued by political problems, instability, military coups, and human rights 
abuses.  Industrialization was obviously creating a labor class and urban sectors that 
began to claim a larger share of economic benefits and more political participation. 
Public and private sector wage increases related to industrialization and modernization 
strategies encouraged faster migration from farm to towns, demanding jobs and public 
services, and causing social unrest.  When the economic limits of the ISI strategy (high 
levels of inflation, balance of payment crises) converged with social unrest, many 
developing countries suffered military coups against a civilian government accused of 
being too corrupt or too weak to control the economic and social crisis; the need to 
reestablish order were the reasons generally utilized to try to justify the breakdown of the 
democratic process (see for instance, Diaz-Bonilla and Schamis 2001, on Argentina).  As 
Hirschman (1982) noticed, faith in the development consensus was badly damaged by a 
series of political disasters, “ranging from civil wars to the establishment of murderous 
authoritarian regimes”, and the “wholesale loss of civil and human rights” that were 
perceived as to be  “somehow connected with the stresses and strains accompanying 
development and ‘modernization’”.   
  
The accumulation of all these (true or alleged) negative impacts on society of the excess 
support for industry led to a reevaluation of the development strategy in many developing 
countries. It was considered that those countries would benefit by adopting a more 
decentralized focus, with better use of the price mechanism, and less protection and 
controls (Little et al., 1970).  The development strategy had to be refocused by taking 
advantage of opportunities in international trade, eliminating the distortions created by 
extreme government intervention, allowing the price system to operate more freely, 
making sure that technology and investment reflected the endowment of human and other 
resources (thus avoiding the emphasis on capital-intensive enterprises), and positively 
reappraising the role of agriculture in the economy (see Balassa, 1971; Little et al., 1970; 
Krueger, 1978). Countries in Asia, and some in Latin America, building on previous ISI 
stages, turned towards export-led strategies that generated many of the success stories of 
the last decades in terms of growth, industrialization, employment, and poverty reduction.   
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Industrialization strategies increased over time the share of developing countries in world 
industrial value added (Table 2), from 15-18 percent during the period of ISI to less than 
25 percent in the 1990s (clearly lower than the share of industrial countries in world 
agriculture, a fact whose implications are discussed later).  However, and although it can 
be argued that industrialization in developing countries remained relatively small in a 
world context, their export successes began to find trade limits in industrialized countries, 
through some measures not necessarily GATT-compatible, such as voluntary export 
restraints and quotas (as in the case of textiles). 
5 At the same time, within GATT, there 
was a strengthening of the Anti-Dumping Agreement during the Kennedy Round (1964-
1967), and of the code for subsidies and countervailing measures during the Tokyo 
Round (1973-1979). Domestic, and above all, export subsidies for industrial goods were 
tightly disciplined. Agriculture, however, followed a different route.  
 
IV AGRICULTURE IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
Historical Perspective  
 
An obvious observation is that over the last half of the century or so, world economic 
policies affecting agricultural policies have differed markedly across countries: those 
policies tended to tax agriculture in developing countries, while the sector was subsidized 
in industrialized countries (World Bank 1986). In the United States, agricultural policies 
were a reaction to the Great Depression: the need to support farmers' incomes and the 
family farms and to stabilize prices and supplies provided the main rationale behind the 
policies followed (Gardner, 1990; Rapp, 1988).  Although the world had changed 
substantially since the 1930s, the policies instituted then, with some variations, were in 
place until the 1995 Farm Bill when a different approach was followed, only to reappear 
with a vengeance in the current legislative initiatives considered by the US Congress for 
the new Farm Bill (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe, 1999; Orden, 2002). 
 
Modern agricultural policies in Western Europe and Japan emerged from somewhat 
different concerns. At the end of the WWII, Europe was a devastated territory, suffering 
food deficits, threatened by internal turmoil and menaced by the presence of the Red 
Army, stationed at the other side of the Iron Curtain.  For the US and the western allies, it 
was important to develop a strong regional economy to counter the presence of the USSR 
in the other half of Europe.  At the national political level, farmers were seen as a 
conservative force that would provide some balance to left-leaning urban political parties 
and labor groups.  The Common Agricultural Policy, enshrined in the Treaty of Rome 
that launched in 1957 the then European Community, reflected in part those concerns.  In 
Japan, not only agricultural policies but also agricultural structures were the result of the 
postwar developments.  The victors of WWII implemented a sweeping land reform with 
                                                 
5 Of course, some of the trade restraints in industrialized countries were also directed to other developed 
countries, such as Japan.   
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the vision of a pacifist Japan in which a political block of numerous small family farms 
would provide the basic constituency for democratic parties. 
6   
 
In summary, both regions were crucial strategic anchors in the Cold War era, the political 
support of agricultural groups was considered key to the pro-western alliances at the 
national level, political stability required that food shortages were avoided, and the 
economic reconstruction of those war-ravaged economies needed a strong and growing 
agricultural sector.  The strategy followed can be called import substitution agriculture 
(ISA) for which there were also some postulated multifunctional effects to agriculture, 
although different from the ones emphasized currently.  Policy regimes were (and still 
are) based on domestic subsidies and trade protection, and later, for some countries with 
growing surpluses, also included export subsidies (see below).    
 
In a world of food shortages and weakened countries emerging from WWII, the US, as a 
dominant agricultural producer, did not see any need to include agriculture within the 
recently created GATT. In fact, in mid 1950s the US sought and obtained waivers for the 
establishment of quotas in peanuts, dairy, and sugar products, to isolate from world 
markets some of the agricultural programs instituted during the 1930's (Rausser, 1995; 
Josling et al., 1996).  Although agricultural interests in the US grew more concerned over 
time with the increasingly closed markets in Europe and Japan, during the 1950s and 
1960s Cold War concerns dominated economic disputes. The Dillon and the Kennedy 
Rounds failed to integrate agriculture into GATT.  
 
The world economy grew at a healthy rate over the first postwar decades, trade expanded 
substantially (spurred by the initial rounds of GATT negotiations), and agricultural 
production increased in step with demand.  During the seventies, the oil crisis and the 
sharp increase in prices in many commodities rekindled worries about global food 
scarcity and the exhaustion of natural resources. Policies to protect and encourage 
agricultural production seemed sensible given the alarm over food and natural resource 
shortages: USA, Europe, and Japan continued and reinforced their protectionist 
agricultural policies, and agriculture was again excluded from GATT disciplines during 
the Tokyo Round (Josling et al., 1996).  
 
In the 1980s the macroeconomic environment changed substantially.  After the second oil 
shock, governments in industrialized countries did not react by accommodating the 
higher oil prices but resorted to tighter monetary policies to control inflation. 
Macroeconomic deflation greatly depressed effective demand for agricultural products.  
Also, the treatment of the debt crisis (requiring a sharp adjustment in developing 
countries to the reversal of capital flows) forced them to step up the production of 
tradable agricultural products to cut imports or to expand exports, in order to service the 
debt.   
 
An important modification in world agriculture was the transformation of the European 
Union (EU) from a net importer of a variety of products (including wheat and other 
                                                 
6 For the discussion of US strategic interests regarding Europe, and Japan during the Cold War, see, among 
others, Ambrose, 1980; Brown, 1983; and Gaddis, 1982.  
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cereals, beef, sugar, and some fruit and vegetable products) during the 1960s and 1970s, 
to a net exporter through the heavy use of domestic subsidies, import restrictions and 
export subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
7  Since then the EU has 
been the main source of subsidized agricultural exports, but other countries, mostly the 
US and other industrialized countries, have also utilized export subsidies. 
8   
 
The increased productive capacity created in the seventies confronted reduced growth in 
effective demand, and fears of food shortages were replaced by concerns about deflation 
and excess supply (Insel, 1985).  Problems were masked in part by the accumulation of 
stocks in the US during the first half of the 1980s, but when the Farm Bill of 1985 
changed American agricultural policies and stopped building those stocks, excess supply 
was revealed in its full extent. Other factors that added to the supply side and/or 
weakened the demand side of agricultural markets during the 1980s included the 
agricultural transformation in China, the expansion of the Green Revolution in many 
developing countries, and the break-up of the Soviet Union (see Sanderson, 1990; 
Borensztein et al., 1994).   
 
By the end of the 1980's it was clear to policy makers in many countries that world 
agriculture showed important imbalances, that policies were working at cross purposes 
and that they imposed heavy burdens on consumers, producers and taxpayers in many 
regions.  Total transfers to agriculture in Western Europe, US, Japan and Canada, ranged 
from 250 to 290 billion dollars in the second half of the 1980's (amounting to over 2% of 
their GDP) (OECD, several issues) and generated substantial welfare losses for the 
industrialized countries and the world (Sanderson, 1990).  
 
Lower world prices and deteriorating public sector finances, both in developed and 
developing countries, led to fiscal adjustments and pressures to reduce support for 
agriculture in many countries. The discussions surrounding the Farm Bills of the US in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the adjustments in the CAP in the 1990s, and the structural 
adjustment programs which unilaterally or as a condition of loans by international 
financial institutions reduced support for agriculture in many developing countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s, are all events that can be viewed as part of the efforts to confront 
deteriorated circumstances in agricultural markets and macroeconomic variables (Diaz-
Bonilla, 2001).   
 
                                                 
 
7 In the 1960s and 1970s the current countries of the EU imported per year an average of about 21 million 
metric tons (MT) of cereals, 550,000 MT of beef, and 2 million MT of sugar; since the 1980s, however, 
those countries became net exporters of 18 million MT, around 500,000 MT, and almost 3.5 million MT for 
the same products, on average per year (see Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000). 
 
8For the period 1986-1997, European exports subsidies amounted to about 123.9 billion US dollars; and the 
US utilized 9.5 billion US dollars (Leetmaa and Ackerman, 1999; the calculations do not include the US 
tax treatment of "foreign sales corporations", which has been found in violation of the export subsidies 
disciplines of the WTO).  Those export subsidies amounted to almost 13% of all agricultural exports by 
Africa, LAC, and Asia (minus China) combined, during the same period (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).   
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For all these reasons, it was certainly welcomed that the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
(initiated in 1986) included the agricultural sector as a main priority. Policies that were 
based on reactions to the Great Depression of the 1930s, fears of food shortages in the 
1970s, and the Cold War (that ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991), were 
still in place, and badly needed to be adjusted.  But, as with ISI in developing countries, 
protection embedded in ISA in industrialized countries have been capitalized into 
economic assets that their owners did not want to see devalued.  On the political side, the 
agricultural sector in the developed countries still has significant clout: it provides the 
necessary votes that support powerful senior positions in the US Congress, may make the 
difference in tight political elections in US and Europe, and agricultural constituencies 
are a key component of the main political party in Japan (see among others Rapp, 1988; 
Hayami, 1986 and 1990). 
 
It is against that background of agricultural surpluses, fiscal constraints, and pressures 
from trade negotiation that the modern notion of multifunctionality emerged in developed 
countries, mostly in Europe and Japan.   
 
Multifunctionality in Agriculture 
 
The arguments promoting the multifunctional role of agriculture have a similar structure 
to those utilized for industrialization.  Some developed countries are fretting over the 
sustainability, under a liberalized agricultural regime, of agriculture and the externalities 
attributed to the sector.  In this case it is not as much a question of how to move toward a 
desirable future (as in the ISI), but how to preserve a remembered past.   
 
The argument runs as follows.  Farmers receive money for the food and fiber that they 
produce.  But to society as a whole, they bring numerous benefits for which they are not 
compensated.  First, they provide rural jobs, considering that farm work is the principal 
form of employment in their rural areas.  In order for people (especially young adults) to 
stay in rural areas, they need to see that local employment will continue to be a viable 
prospect.  But the importance of agriculture would go beyond employment per se: for 
people in rural areas to be farmers has its own intrinsic merits, not the least that they 
provide some sort of social continuity and stewardship over a “cultural heritage.”  
 
Farmers also create scenic vistas.  For many urban dwellers, a drive through cultivated 
rural terrain is a stimulating experience, with their wide, open spaces offering a 
refreshing counterpoint to city life.  Farmland may also attract foreign visitors, thus 
adding to tourist receipts.  No market forces control the distribution of these views. 
 
Another positive externality of agriculture, it has been argued, is environmental and 
biodiversity protection.  Compared to abandoning the land or (some) other alternatives, 
cultivated land may conserve soil and recharge groundwater, create flood controls, and 
provide habitats for rare species. The environmental value of farmland is sometimes 
ingrained in the land, the farm and the rural community, as cultivation over many years 
has led to unique and specific adaptations, and knowledge.   
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Finally, there is the persistent notion that greater domestic food production equals greater 
food security.  To the degree to which food can be produced locally, runs the argument, it 
should be (Hines 2000).  World commodity markets can be tumultuous, and access is 
often imperfect, especially in times of international strife.  More circumscribed 
arguments in this line emphasize the notion of insurance, suggesting the need to 
guarantee some (undefined) percentage of total consumption with domestic production, 
perhaps to maintain farmer’s know-how and farmland in use if production has to be 
expanded due to unforeseen disruptions in world production and trade. 
 
The argument also rests on the idea of joint production: the emergence of these positive 
externalities is inseparable from the production of food and fiber.  Moreover, it is argued 
that these externalities do not have markets, and cannot be provided by private collective 
action.  Again, as in the case of industrialization, there is an argument for governments to 
intervene in order to support and protect the private producers who generate these 




By now many of the arguments in favor of, and against, granting multifunctionality a 
separate role in agricultural policy-making and the negotiations have been extensively 
analyzed, and there are different publications arguing both sides of the policy debate 
(European Union, 1999; Royal Ministry of Agriculture Norway, 1998; Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 1999; OECD, 2001a; ABARE, 1998; USDA 
1999). Most of the discussion so far has centered on whether the benefits of 
multifunctionality are jointly and inseparably obtained with agricultural production (and 
therefore if a country wants those benefits it has to support production, possibly distorting 
trade in the process), or whether the benefits have a separate existence (and thus can be 
generated through non-distorting measures, possibly those already considered in the 
Green Box of the WTO).  Of course it is also important to determine whether there are 
missing markets, and even if that is the case, whether private collective action can solve 
the problem, before resorting to government action. And even after all those issues have 
been properly addressed, there is still the issue of what are the appropriate policy 
interventions: there may be several of them that need to be evaluated, or, even, it may be 
the case that no adequate policy instruments are available.  Recently the OECD (2001a) 
presented a very detailed economic framework for analysis of alternative policies. 
 
Criticisms point to the assumptions, policy implications and instruments utilized.  For 
instance, showing that a productive sector (in this case agriculture, but similarly for 
others) has positive externalities for the rest of the society does not necessarily imply that 
production has to be especially encouraged beyond the level that it would have normally 
attained under no intervention.  If the multifunctionality effect is separate from 
production, then it is better to subsidize directly that effect, rather than production.  
 
If for some reason the postulated externalities emerge only as inseparable joint products 
with production, then there are still other issues to consider.  For one, the sector may have 
negative externalities as well, such as damages to the environment and biodiversity (see  
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for instance European Environment Agency, 2001). Widespread use of chemicals, 
fostered by high prices of agricultural products due, in turn, to subsidies and protection, 
adversely affect soil and water quality.  High levels of animal manure originating from 
intensive livestock production damage drinking water quality.  Intensive farming and 
overgrazing leads to habitat loss and reduced biodiversity. The multifunctional effect of 
scenic vistas may also be damaged by farms with negative externalities (odor, pesticide 
use, habitat destruction).  
 
Moreover, subsidizing a sector to make it expand beyond what would have otherwise 
been its normal level will increase its use of all types of resources from the economy, 
competing with other sectors. To the extent that some of those resources are not 
completely idle, costs of production will increase in the non-subsidized sectors, which 
may force them to contract.  Then cost-benefit analysis would be needed to assess 
whether the costs of encouraging a sector beyond its “natural” level (in terms of the main 
products and of the externalities attached to them) may be larger than the benefits, 
considering the production and multifunctionality effects that may have been lost in other 
sectors.   
 
Different studies of agricultural policies in industrialized economies have shown the 
welfare costs they are imposing on the rest of the society (and also the world; see below), 
although not all claimed multifunctional effects have been factored into those studies.  
Simulations of reductions of agricultural support in industrialized countries show 
important benefits for those countries (see, for instance, Sharma, Konandreas, and 
Greenfield, 1996; Goldin and van-der-Mensbrugghe, 1995, for the Uruguay Round; and 
Hertel, et al 2000; USDA/ERS, 2001; ABARE, 1999; for the current negotiations). This 
is in part the result of consumers and taxpayers in rich countries receiving the equivalent 
of a tax cut in the form of less border protection and reduced fiscal transfers (or of being 
taxed with less distorting instruments, if import taxes are replaced with other revenues). 
9/  
Although not all those payments are net welfare losses for the society as a whole 
(because farmers receive part of what the consumer and the taxpayer transfer), they are 
still substantial: for OECD countries transfers from consumers amounted to about 170 
billion US dollars per year during 1998-2000 and direct fiscal transfers to more than 80 
billion US dollars per year (not counting general services for agriculture; OECD, several 
issues).  In addition there are also production-side costs resulting from a less efficient 
allocation of resources.  However, as agriculture represents a smaller fraction of the 
industrialized countries’ economies, the costs of the ISA (now), although important, do 
not necessarily have the same relative relevance for those countries as the ISI had for 
developing countries (then).  This fact has important implications for how the costs and 
benefits of those policies are divided within and across countries (see below).   
 
Even if there is undersupply of net positive externalities for the society as a whole 
(considering the agricultural sector itself and the impact on other sectors) due to the lack 
of production of the basic items that generate them, it is still a question of what is the best 
                                                 
9  Some critics have utilized those numbers as a demonstration of the lack of equity of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Although there are indeed imbalances in the AoA, the criticisms utilizing the results from 
those studies are based on misunderstandings of how welfare is measured.    
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policy to foster those externalities.  As shown before, most economic analysis would 
argue that the first-best alternative would most likely not be trade protection.  For 
instance, if the concern is about rural livelihoods, it is not clear, nostalgia aside, that the 
most beneficial intervention on behalf of rural populations would be to target the 
agricultural sector per se instead of the geographic area in general with (say) tourism 
infrastructure and telecommunications.  For environmental protection it would be better 
to subsidize directly the desired environmental practice.  In other cases different 
approaches can be tried such as buying the land and selling it to trusts that can then 
administer the land according to best practice (which also goes towards scenic vistas).  
Also, even within a range of possible trade and/or production distorting policies, 
measures other than the ones currently applied may generate the desired multifunctional 
effects (Blandford, 2000). 
 
Other criticisms, as in the case of the ISI, focus on the consequences of widespread 
government intervention for rent seeking and, eventually, corruption.  The European 
Union’s innovative efforts to monitor payments made under the 1992 CAP reforms 
display the unavoidable enforcement problems associated with subsidies in practice (see, 
for instance, Commission of the European Community, 1999; OLAF/ European Anti-
Fraud Office, 2001).  Even in the case of zero corruption, the influence of a well-
informed and interested group of farmers, combined with (perhaps equally) interested 
bureaucrats dispensing the subsidy, will tend to produce a public good beyond its 
maximum net benefit for the society.  
 
Another important issues to evaluate ISA, also discussed in the context of the ISI, are 
equity and income distribution.  One of the objectives of the agricultural policies in many 
industrialized countries has been to bring agricultural incomes in line with the rest of the 
population. By and large, this objective seems to have been attained and perhaps 
exceeded in some industrialized countries (OECD, 1999).  But those policies are also 
reinforcing unequal income distribution patterns within agriculture, with agricultural 
support mostly received by the largest farmers (OECD, 1999).  A better way would be to 
target income transfers to smaller farmers or low-income farmers, but both in the EU and 
the US measures intended to cap the amount transferred to large farmers have faced 
strong resistance.  Equity concerns must include also wider calculations considering 
consumers and taxpayers in general. Market protection to support agriculture increases 
the price of food and hurts the poor, who spend a larger share of income in those 
products. And the equity impact of budget transfers will also depend on the structure of 
taxes (OECD, 1999). 
 
So far the discussion has focused on the impacts in the countries that claim the need to 
support their own agriculture to maintain its multifunctional effects.  However, through 
the linkage of world markets, agriculture is affected globally through individual 
countries’ policies. In what follows two different issues related to the concept of 
multifunctionality and the special role of agriculture, which have been less analyzed but 
whose implications for developing countries may be more significant, are discussed. The 
first point concerns what multifunctionality is being discussed, since the term seems to 
encompass several components. The second point concerns whose multifunctionality is  
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being addressed through the suggested policies, to the extent that there are distributional 




The fact that different concepts are put together under a single name such as 
multifunctionality, or non-trade concerns, does not necessarily imply that they have 
strong similarities: important distinctions may be needed among those multifunctional 
effects, and, even more complicated from a policy perspective, there may be trade-offs 
among them.   
 
Here the point is the possibility of differentiation within each of those concerns and 
across countries: all of them seem to have completely different meanings for 
industrialized countries, on the one hand, and for the variety of developing countries, on 
the other.  For example, the issue of rural employment and vitality of rural communities 
in industrialized countries, where subsidies are predicated in part on the need to support a 
choice of life style, is completely different in developing countries where most of the 
population is in agriculture, not because that is where they want to be, but because the 
development process has not offered them other alternatives (FAO, 2000, p.65; 
WTO/India, 2001). 
 
Also the notion of food security appears to have different meanings for different 
countries. Currently the WTO recognizes various classifications of countries: developed, 
developing, least developed (LDC), and net food importing developing (NFIDC).  A 
recent study utilizes various methods of cluster analysis and data on five measures of 
food security (food production per capita, the ratio of total exports to food imports, 
consumption of calories per capita, consumption of proteins per capita, and the rural/non-
rural population share) to classify 167 countries (including industrialized and developing 
ones) according to their food security profiles (Diaz-Bonilla et al., 2000).  The analysis 
identifies 12 distinct clusters characterized by similarities and differences across the 
various measures.  Among other things, the typology shows, unsurprisingly, that all 
developed countries are included in food secure categories.  These results suggest that the 
notion of food security introduced as part of the multifunctionality of agriculture, or, 
more generally, among non-trade concerns, has a very different meaning in developed 
and developing countries.  Maintaining the same label for altogether different situations 
in industrialized and developing countries (with further differentiations among the latter) 
only obscures the issues being negotiated (Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000).    
 
Environmental problems in agriculture also differ across countries, appearing mostly as 
pollution of land and water, due to excess use of agrochemicals in industrialized countries 
(in part, a consequence of generous production subsidies) and degradation and overuse of 
natural resources in developing countries (resulting mostly from poverty and lack of 
financial support to improve technology).  Finally, the issue of maintenance of rural 
landscapes in industrialized countries, as a way of allowing urban dwellers scenic vistas 
and the possibility of country-side relaxation, does not seem to have an obvious 
equivalent in impoverished developing countries.   
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Therefore, from the perspective of developing countries, if the notion of 
multifunctionality is utilized during the negotiations, an important effort may be needed 
to identify exactly which is the nature of non-trade concerns as they apply to low and 
middle-income countries, avoiding the confusions that may be generated by using similar 
labels for altogether different situations.  In any case, it is not clear that the main concerns 
of developing countries cannot be presented using more traditional argument linked to 
poverty alleviation, food security, and rural development, without the need to resort to 
new and more controversial notions such as multifunctionality.   
 
Whose multifunctionality?  
 
If the premise that multifunctionality is a joint product with agricultural production is 
provisionally accepted for the sake of argument, the immediate problem is whose 
agricultural production levels are being supported and whose may be hurt in the process.   
Given some level of demand for food and agricultural products determined by income, 
prices, population, and tastes, any attempt at expanding production in a group of 
countries on account of the multifunctionality effects would negatively affect agricultural 
production in countries that do not have the resources to subsidize agriculture.  The 
global implications of ISA, given the larger weight of industrialized countries in world 
agriculture (about 40 percent, clearly above the less than 25 percent share of developing 
countries in world industry; see Table 2), may be substantial.   
 
Different studies before the Uruguay Round, during the Round, and now evaluating 
current negotiations, have tried to quantify the impact on developing countries of 
agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries. They usually predicted substantial 
positive effects on developing countries’ income, production, and exports of agricultural 
and agroindustrial products from an eventual reduction of tariffs and other forms of 
agricultural protection and subsidization in industrialized countries (Valdés and Zietz, 
1980; Goldin and Knudsen, 1990; Sharma, Konandreas, and Greenfield, 1996;  Goldin 
and van-der-Mensbrugghe, 1995; Hertel, et al 2000; USDA/ERS, 2001; ABARE, 1999; 
Diao et al 2002). 
10   
 
For instance Table 3 and 4 show the percentage change in agricultural production 
(including primary and agroindustrial food products) that may result in developing 
countries and transition economies from the elimination of protection and subsidization 
in developed countries, as calculated from Diao et al (2002).  Production increases by 
more than 42 billion dollars (in real terms) compared to the baseline, with the largest 
changes in Latin America and Asia (Table 3). The more disaggregated Table 4 shows that 
all the developing countries and regions increase their production, although with 
variations (some of the large increases are from low base values).  
 
                                                 
10 The reference is to production because multifunctional effects have been linked to it.  In the simulations 
however, production effects may be different from overall welfare effects, depending on other issues such 
as changes in terms of trade.   
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To the extent that the notion of multifunctionality has been suggested mainly by 
industrialized countries, which have the resources to utilize those subsidies, the result of 
such an approach may be more production and multifunctional effects in richer countries, 
and less of both in developing countries, which cannot afford such policies.  Considering 
that agriculture and agroindustry are the main economic activities in many developing 
countries, particularly poor ones, and that such activities usually have significant growth 
multipliers for the whole economy (see, for instance, Delgado et al, 1998, for Africa), the 
level of non-realized benefits (including the multifunctional effects) for those economies 
as a consequence of the expansion of agriculture in subsidizing countries, may be 
significant. 
 
In summary, the notion of multifunctionality does not solve the issue of distributive 
effects across countries; it simply adds another dimension.  There is always the question 
of whose production and, multifunctional effects, expand or contract as a result of 
protection and subsidization.  
 




While in the previous sections the policy issues related to the different approaches to 
agricultural and industrial development were discussed, here the focus is on the legal 
treatment under international trade obligations for those sectors.  It is clear that 
agricultural and industrial goods were treated differently in GATT (Josling et al., 1996), 
and although some of the most obvious differences have been narrowed during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations leading to the creation of the WTO, they are still subject to 
separate disciplines. A point to be noticed is that in note 2 to Article XVI Section B, 
primary products are defined as “any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in 
its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to 
prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade.”  This implies that 
many of the “agricultural” products treated differently, are in fact agroindustrial goods 
(meat, sugar, dairy products, and so no).  Therefore, the differential treatment under 
GATT and the WTO is not only between primary agriculture and industry, but also 
between those industries based on agricultural raw materials and the rest of the 
manufacturing sector (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).    
 





GATT regulations, through Article XI General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, 
prohibited quantitative restrictions (quotas, import or export licences or similar measures) 
for goods in general.  However, the same article included, in paragraph 2 (c), an exception 
for “agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form (understood as “the same 
products when in an early stage of processing and still perishable, which compete directly  
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with the fresh product and if freely imported would tend to make the restriction on the fresh 
product ineffective”), necessary to the enforcement of governmental programs for those 
products or to remove temporary surpluses.   
 
Over time, however, other types of quantitative restrictions, such as voluntary export 
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or similar export and import measures  
(referred as to “grey area” measures), were increasingly utilized, affecting mostly 
industrialized products.  During the Uruguay Round those “grey measures” were 
prohibited in general, and it was agreed that those existing had to be phased out.  
 
Yet, for agricultural goods, the negotiations maintained some quantitative restrictions, 
although on a more limited basis.  The general rule was that all border measures in 
agriculture other than ordinary customs duties (such as quantitative import restrictions, 
variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff 
measures maintained through state trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints and any 
other schemes) had to be transformed into tariffs (the so-called “tariffication” process), 
and then reduced over the six year implementation period, by 36% (simple average) with 
a minimum rate of reduction of 15% for each tariff line. Developing countries could 
apply 2/3 of the rates of reduction indicated above.  But tariff-rate quotas 
11 were allowed 
to guarantee current access and minimum access (where there were no significant 
imports, minimum access opportunities had to be offered, beginning in the first year of 
the implementation period with not less than 3% of corresponding domestic consumption 
in the base period, and expanded to reach 5% of that base figure by the end of the 
implementation period).  Also there was an exception for the tariffication of sensitive 
products under strictly defined conditions, leading to the possibility of utilizing tariff-rate 
quotas for some specific products in a reduced number of countries (originally only four 




The Uruguay Round also clarified the rules for Safeguards, the trade constraints that 
countries can use to protect any productive sector when it is threatened by an unexpected 
surge in imports that can cause injury to that sector (Agreement on Safeguards of the 
WTO).  But again another exception was created for agricultural products: the creation of 
a  “special safeguard” for agricultural products that have complied with the "tariffication" 
of previous non-tariff barriers.  This trade remedy is different from the normal safeguard 
of Article XIX of the General Agreement. The latter requires proof of injury to the 
domestic producers from imports and the granting of compensation (i.e. opportunities for 
market access in other products that are equivalent in trade value to the trade reduced due 
to the safeguard). The “special safeguard” for agriculture, however, does not require 
                                                 
11 A tariff-rate quota includes two components: a quota up to some defined quantity (that still may pay a  
tariff), and a high tariff for imports above that quantity. It differs from a common quota that has only the 
first component, while under a TRQ there may be imports above that quantity but paying the higher out-of-
quota tariffs. In practice these tariffs are very high so no additional imports usually take place. However, as 
tariffs are reduced in successive negotiations, the quota component of a TRQ may become less binding and 
tariffs then become the main trade instrument, as was the intent of the tariffication process.   
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either proof of injury or compensation: it allows the application of additional duties based 
on a price trigger (i.e. shipments at prices denominated in domestic currencies below a 
certain reference level) or a quantity trigger (i.e. imports surging above certain levels 
depending on the current levels of imports as a proportion of consumption).  On the other 
hand, the special safeguard can be maintained only until the end of the year in which it has 
been imposed, and “may only be levied at a level which shall not exceed one third of the 
level of the ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in which the action is taken” (Article 
5 Special Safeguard Provisions, of the Agreement on Agriculture). The normal safeguard 
has more latitude in terms of the time period when it is applied (in principle not more than 
four years, but it can be extended up to a maximum of eight years), and the levels of 
tariffs or quantitative restrictions utilized (although if quantitative restrictions are imposed, 
they should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last 
three representative years, unless clear justification is given that a different level is 





Probably the most important area of differences in treatment between agricultural and 
industrial goods is in export subsidies.  In the GATT framework Article VI Anti-dumping 
and Countervailing Duties, and Article XVI Subsidies, Section B, specified a different 
treatment for export subsidies for primary products (but see above the discussion on the 
meaning of primary). Although it was recognized that export subsidies have harmful effects 
on other countries (Art. XVI, Section B, paragraph 2), GATT contracting parties were only 
exhorted to “seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products”, but if 
they utilized those subsides, countries should not apply them in a manner that “results in 
that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that 
product” (whose meaning was left undefined, and led to many discussion within GATT; 
see Josling et al 1996).  
 
During the Uruguay Round, export subsidies, in general, were considered in greater detail 
in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), building on a 
previous agreement that had been approved during the Tokyo Round. The WTO ASCM 
establishes that subsidies that are contingent, “in law or in fact, whether solely or as one 
of several other conditions, upon export performance” (as well as those based on the use 
of domestic over imported goods), are prohibited. If a WTO member complains and it is 
found that a country is applying those subsidies, they must be immediately withdrawn; 
and if this does not happen within the specified time period, the complaining member can 
withdraw equivalent trade concessions. 
 
Although additional disciplines on agricultural export subsidies were agreed during the 
Uruguay Round, the differential treatment for agriculture was maintained: those practices 
were limited but not completely eliminated. WTO members agreed to cut agricultural 
export subsidies by 36% in value and 21% in quantity over the six-year implementation 
period compared to the 1986-90 base period level. In the case of developing countries, 
the reductions are two-thirds those of developed countries over a ten-year period (with no  
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reductions applying to the least-developed countries). 
12 There is some limited flexibility 
to carry unused levels of subsidies between years.  
 
Compared to export subsidies for other products (which, as indicated were prohibited and 
had to be eliminated if shown to exist), agricultural export subsides, if they are within the 
limits considered in the schedules of the AoA (which established maximum levels per 
year based on the agreed cuts in value and quantity), receive a less drastic treatment if 
challenged by other WTO Member. Article 13 Due Restraint (also called the “Peace 
Clause”) point (c) indicates that “export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of 
Part V of this Agreement, as reflected in each Member's Schedule” can be subject to 
countervailing duties only “upon a determination of injury or threat thereof”, and “due 
restraint shall be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations”; and they are 
exempted from other possible countermeasures based on nullification or impairment of 
concessions and/or serious prejudice (as defined in Article XVI of GATT 1994 and 




Within the GATT framework Article XVI considered the possibility of subsidies in one 
country causing “serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party” on export 
or import markets.  As indicated during the Uruguay Round, subsidies and possible 
remedies were considered in greater detail in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM).  Three categories of subsidies were defined: 
prohibited (export subsidies and those based on the use of domestic over imported goods); 
actionable; and non-actionable or permitted subsidies.   
 
The differences regarding export subsidies for agricultural and industrial goods have been 
discussed in the previous sections.  But there is also a differential treatment in the case of 
the other two general types of subsidies, actionable and non-actionable.  In the first case, 
the ASCM of the WTO indicates that “no Member, should cause, through the use of any 
subsidy… adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a) injury to the domestic 
industry of another Member...; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly 
or indirectly to other Members”; and.”(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another 
Member.” (Article 5 of ASCM).  But that Article immediately adds that it “ does not apply 
to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.”   
 
Subsidies are defined as financial contribution by the government, or income or price 
support (Article 1 of ASCM) , that benefit a specific (i.e. does not include generic support) 
industry, groups of firms, or firm  (Article 2 of ASCM).  Serious prejudice is presumed to 
exist under certain circumstance defined in the ASCM, particularly when the total ad 
valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5 per cent. In those cases, the subsidizing 
                                                 
12  Developing countries are also exempted, provided that they “are not applied in a manner that would 
circumvent reduction commitments”, from cuts on subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of 
agricultural products or internal transport and freight charges on export shipments (Agreement on 
Agriculture; Article 9 Export Subsidy Commitments).  
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member has to show that the subsidies in question do not cause serious prejudice to the 
complaining member (i.e. the burden of the proof is inverted). In general, actionable 
subsidies may lead to the imposition of countervailing duties on subsidized imports by 
the complaining WTO member when they affect a domestic industry.  But in other cases 
(such as when subsidies are displacing exports of the complaining country in a third 
market), the disputes are referred to the dispute settlement process, and if it is determined 
that there are adverse effects, the subsidizing member must withdraw the subsidy or 
compensate the complaining party with access in other products.   
 
The third category of non-actionable subsidies include those that are not specific (as 
defined in Article 2), and three exceptions defined in Article 8.2 (a), (b) and (c ). These 
exceptions include assistance to industrial research (up to 75% of the costs) and pre-
competitive development activity (up to 50%), assistance to disadvantaged regions, and 
some environmental subsidies (all those exceptions have additional conditions to qualify 
as such). Still, if another member complains that a non-actionable subsidy is causing 
serious adverse effects to its domestic industry, the issue enters the process of 
consultation, negotiations, and eventual dispute settlement.  
 
The ASCM also exempts Least-developed countries and developing countries that have 
less than 1000 dollars of income per capita from disciplines on prohibited export 
subsidies, and they have 8 years to eliminate other prohibited subsidies. For other 
developing countries, the export subsidy prohibition applies after 8 years and the 
elimination of other prohibited subsidies after 5 years (7 for transition economies).  There 
are also special provisions regarding the application of countervailing duties, and other 
remedies when the subsidizing WTO member is a developing country, in the case of 
privatizations, and for countries in transition towards market economies.  
 
But while those rules apply to goods in general, agricultural products are again treated 
differently. Article 13 b) of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that domestic support 
measures in the Green Box are (i) non-actionable for purposes of countervailing duties;  (ii) 
are exempt from actions based on claims of injury, nullification and impairment of 
concessions, and serious prejudice; and (iii) are also exempt from actions based on non-
violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions. 
13  Further, 
Article 13 c) also exempts domestic support measures under Article 6 of the AoA (which 
includes the Blue Box, used now mostly by the EU; the de minimis levels of support in 
developed and developing countries and subsidies given to low-income and resource-poor 
farmers and some other subsidies permitted for developing countries) from (i) the 
imposition of countervailing duties unless there is injury (and due restraint shall be shown 
in initiating any countervailing duty investigations;  (ii) from actions based on claims of 
injury, nullification and impairment of concessions, and serious prejudice, if the subsidies 
on a commodity basis did not exceed those budgeted for the 1992 marketing year; and (iii) 
from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits of tariff 
concessions,  with, again, the limit of 1992 by commodity.  
                                                 
13  This is a special claim that a country can make against other country, arguing that even though the latter 
did not violate any specific WTO rule, it is doing something that the first country claims is reducing or 
eliminating the value of trade concessions.  
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In summary subsidization and protection of the agricultural sector is permitted to an 
extent not allowed for industrial products, while at the same time the possible actions to 
counter those practices by the countries affected are more limited, particularly due to 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Without discussing the welfare implications 
of this asymmetry, at least in legal terms there appears to be an imbalance between what 
developing countries can do for their industry and what developed countries can do for 
their agriculture.  Some have called the latter a special and differential treatment for rich 
countries.  Developed countries have maintained enough legal room under the WTO, and 
have the financial resources, to implement the variety of policies in agriculture, while 
developing countries, although also having enough legal room of maneuver on 
agricultural policies, often lack the needed financial resources to implement those 
policies, while facing some constraints on how to defend themselves from the agricultural 
policies of industrial countries.  This situation is different in industrial goods, where 
developing countries appear more tightly constrained on policies aimed at subsidizing 
and protecting their industries, while developed countries retain more legal instruments to 
counter possible undesired practices from developing countries.   
 
Certainly the adequate answer (in welfare terms) to this imbalance it is not to ask for 
developing countries to have more legal access to distorting policy instruments for 
industrial development (which, not even counting the possible negative welfare effects 
for developing countries themselves, is a battle that no amount of legal freedom can 
compensate given the disparity of financial resources between industrialized countries 
and the rest), but to move agriculture further into full integration of WTO rules. 
14 
 
VI. THAT WAS THEN BUT THIS IS NOW 
 
This paper presented two cases where governments have found cause to subsidize certain 
sectors based on their expected multiple contributions to public welfare.  A notion of 
multifunctionality was clearly behind support for industry in developing countries, 
particularly in the first decades after WWII.  During the 1950s and 1960s there was a 
fairly broad consensus that industrial development in developing countries would lead to 
several desirable side effects: independence from the metropolis, nation building and 
national security, modernization of their societies, social mobility, employment, 
urbanization which was linked to more modern attitudes to government and society, the 
reduction of the impact of external shocks amplified by the dependency on primary 
products, and technological development, among other things. In this case (as it is now 
argued regarding the multifunctionality of agriculture), the policy implication was that 
government intervention (through trade protection, subsidies, and other special policies) 
was required to develop an industrial base that had a social value higher than markets 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that although the WTO legal system restricts the range of instruments that can be 
utilized to develop the industrial sector, the policies restricted are usually the most controversial in terms of 
net welfare effects for the country applying them, while those allowed still include a variety of measures 
that can be utilized within a vision of industrial development based on science and technology (Amsden, 
2000).  These measures, utilizing the terminology of the Agreement on Agriculture, are in most cases  
equivalent to those of the Green Box.  
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alone would suggest.  But, also as in the case of multifunctionality of agriculture now, the 
problem was that extreme support for a sector had, as a counterpart the discrimination 
against other productive activities.  Expanding the industrial sector, whatever its 
multifunctional qualities, affected production and employment in other sectors (such as 
agriculture), and some argued further that excessive protection and subsidization of 
industry decreased the level of welfare for the society as a whole.  It was also claimed 
that the ISI strategy, although not necessarily industrialization per se, had negative 
impacts on income distribution, and that the pattern of development was more capital 
intensive than necessary, leading to chronic unemployment.  Even in terms of external 
accounts sustainability, import substitution industrialization may have made developing 
countries more, and not less, vulnerable to external shocks.  The accumulation of all these 
negative impacts on society of the excess support for industry led to a reevaluation of the 
ISI strategy in many developing countries, towards a more balance path between 
agriculture and industry, as well as between domestic and export markets.   
 
Yet, from the point of view of the world economy, given the relative size of developing 
countries in the world economy, and the importance within their own economies of 
agriculture and industry (Table 2), the costs were borne basically by the countries 
following the ISI strategy -a key distinction from ISA in industrialized countries, which, 
as argued, has a larger weight in the world economy and important global effects. 
 
Now developed countries invoke similar multifunctional arguments for agriculture.  And 
it is also clear that subsidization and protection of agriculture in industrialized countries 
is imposing costs on the rest of their economies, as inefficient industrialization did in the 
case of developing countries.  But industrialized countries are richer than developing 
countries and the share of the agricultural sector in their economies is small (Table 2): 
therefore the costs for industrialized countries of expanding the multifunctionality of 
agriculture beyond its non-subsidized levels, could in principle be absorbed by their 
societies without the relatively larger economic problems that extreme ISI appears to 
have caused to several developing countries.     
 
However, while the industrial sector in developing countries fostered by ISI was 
relatively small compared to the industrial world economy, the agricultural sector in 
industrialized countries fostered by ISA represents a larger fraction of world agriculture 
(Table 2).  Therefore, a manifestation of encroachment upon other sectors from the 
expansion of agriculture in rich countries appears mainly when the multifunctional 
effects are analyzed beyond the domestic economies of industrialized countries.  Through 
the linkage of world markets, agriculture is affected globally. If all agricultural sectors 
generate externalities, policies subsidizing agriculture in some countries and encouraging 
their expansion beyond what would have been the case without that support, implies that 
the agricultural sector in other countries may be forced to contract (or grow less than 
what would have been otherwise the case).  In this way, some countries would be denied 
the multifunctional benefits of their agricultural sectors.  The old argument regarding the 
bias against agriculture due to the emphasis in industrialization can then be translated into 
the most recent discussion regarding subsidized production in industrial countries 
displacing production in developing countries.   
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A point already noticed is that the current distinction in the WTO texts (and before in 
GATT) is not between agriculture and industry in the disciplines applied, but between 
agriculture primary goods and agroindustrial food products, on the one hand, and the rest 
of the industry on the other.  For instance beef and sugar are agroindustrial goods, which 
generate a good portion of the employment in the processing segment.  This implies that 
it is not only the farmer or the rural economy that may be affected differently by this 
separate treatment, but also workers and entrepreneurs in the agroindustrial sector, some 
of them located in the urban sector.  Therefore the possibility of expanding employment 
in developing countries both in the rural and urban economies may be hampered by this 
differential treatment of agricultural and agroindustrial goods (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 
2000). 
 
But whatever the economic arguments, the limitations under WTO of the instruments to 
promote the multifunctionality of industry in developing countries while maintaining the 
instruments to promote the multifunctionality of agriculture in industrialized countries 
would be a case of glaring legal imbalances between the rights and obligations of 
countries under the WTO.  Certainly, as it was argued, the adequate approach considering 
the welfare implications is to move agriculture further into full integration of WTO rules, 
rather than developing countries trying to have additional legal access to distorting policy 
instruments for industrial development: even without factoring the possible negative 
welfare effects for developing countries themselves of such policies, it seems clear that 
they cannot possibly win a battle of subsidies against industrialized countries. 
 
Yet, if the notion of multifunctionality in agriculture is eventually incorporated in the 
current negotiations, it would seem important to differentiate between the sets of issues of 
interest for industrialized countries and those that mostly affect developing countries, 
specially the poorer ones.  Rather than talking about multifunctionality as a single notion, 
it would be better to separate non-trade concerns and then analyze them separately for 
different categories of countries.  As argued before, the several components involved in 
the notion of multifunctionality (food security, employment, rural lifestyles, environment, 
and the like) assume very different forms in industrialized and developing countries.  By 
mixing all those disparate aspects, the negotiations risk losing sight what is important for 
developing countries, particularly the poorest ones.   
 
In any case, the argument in support of a legal treatment under the WTO that ensures 
rural and agricultural development in developing countries may not need new and 
debated notions such as multifunctionality, and can be more effectively based on 
traditional arguments linked to growth dynamics, poverty alleviation, food security, and 
environmental issues, as they apply to those less favored countries.  Further, the notion of 
multifunctionality may be not only unnecessary for developing countries to support the 
policies needed for rural development, but may also be harmful.  As argued, this would 
be the case if it leads mostly to expand the production of industrialized countries more 
than what would have been the case without the additional support predicated upon such 
notion.  In that case, agricultural production in developing countries (and the 
multifunctional effects linked to it) would contract because of the excess of subsidized  
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production in industrialized countries.  This may be the case even under the more 
restricted debate of whether there are Green Box measures that are less production and 
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Table 2.  Agriculture and Industry Value Added (percentages)     
   
            1965     1985     Average 1990s 
Developing  Countries      
Agriculture  Value  Added      
*share of world agriculture       59       61    61 
*share of developing countries GDP      29       20    14 
Industry  Value  Added        
*share of world industry        15       18    24 
*share of developing countries GDP      29       34    24 
 
Industrialized  Countries      
Agriculture  Value  Added      
*share of world agriculture       41      39    39 
*share of industrialized countries GDP a/     5        3      2  
Industry  Value  Added      
*share of world industry       85      82    76 
*share of industrialized countries GDP a/   40      36    30  
 
Source: 1965 and 1985 from World Bank Development Report 1986; average   
1990s for developing countries from World Development Indicators, 2001; late 
1990s for industrialized countries, estimated from OECD, 2001b     
   




Table 3. Increase in Agricultural Production a/   
  
  Increase in billion dollars 
  
Asia      12.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean  13.3 
Transition Economies       4.8 
Middle  East         3.5 
A f r i c a           6 . 8  
Rest of the Developing World    1.2 
  
TOTAL     42.2 
  
a/ Primary and Agroindustrial Food Products 
Source: Diao et al, 2002  
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Table 4. Increase in Agricultural Production a/         
    
  % over base              % over base 
China                                   1.3    Former Soviet Union              3.8 
Indonesia                               1.1    Rest of Central European b/  2.8 
Malaysia                                 2.7    Turkey                                1.7 
Philippines                             1.2    Rest of Middle East                3.0 
Thailand                                        12.4    Morocco                               3.9 
Viet Nam                                3.7    Rest of North Africa               1.6 
Bangladesh                              0.4    Botswana                              28.2 
India                                   0.5    Rest of SACU                        4.6 
Sri Lanka                                0.8    Malawi                                4.9 
Rest of South Asia                    0.5    Mozambique                            2.2 
Mexico                                  1.2    Tanzania                1.1 
Central America and Caribbean  7.5    Zambia                                3.2 
Colombia                                1.5    Zimbabwe                              5.9 
Peru                                    3.7    Rest of Southern Africa        43.4 
Venezuela                               0.6    Uganda                                0.7 
Rest of Andean Pact                   3.7    Rest of sub-Saharan Africa     2.1 
Argentina                                1.6    Rest of world                         1.1 
Brazil                                  1.7       
Chile                                   2.6       
Uruguay                                 4.1       
Rest of South America                      11.8    TOTAL      2.2 
     
a/ Primary and Agroindustrial Food Products         
b/ Not including Hungary and Poland   
Source: Diao et al, 2002 
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